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of-use#LAAGOLDEN EGGS AND HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING*
DAVID LAIBSON
Hyperbolic discount functions induce dynamically inconsistent preferences,
implying a motive for consumers to constrain their own future choices. This paper
analyzes the decisions of a hyperbolic consumer who has access to an imperfect
commitment technology: an illiquid asset whose sale must be initiated one period
before the sale proceeds are received. The model predicts that consumption tracks
income, and the model explains why consumers have asset-speciﬁc marginal pro-
pensities to consume. The model suggests that ﬁnancial innovation may have
caused the ongoing decline in U. S. savings rates, since ﬁnancial innovation in-
creases liquidity, eliminating commitment opportunities. Finally, the model im-
plies that ﬁnancial market innovation may reduce welfare by providing “too
much” liquidity.
I. INTRODUCTION
“Use whatever means possible to remove a set amount of money
from your bank account each month before you have a chance to
spend it”
—advice in New York Times “Your Money” column [1993].
Many people place a premium on the attribute of self-control.
Individuals who have this capacity are able to stay on diets, carry
through exercise regimens, show up to work on time, and live
within their means. Self-control is so desirable that most of us
complain that we do not have enough of it. Fortunately, there are
ways to compensate for this shortfall. One of the most widely
used techniques is commitment. For example, signing up to give
a seminar is an easy way to commit oneself to write a paper. Such
commitments matter since they create constraints (e.g., dead-
lines) that generally end up being binding.
Strotz [1956] was the ﬁrst economist to formalize a theory of
commitment and to show that commitment mechanisms could be
potentially important determinants of economic outcomes. He
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The Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1997.showed that when individuals’ discount functions are nonexpo-
nential, they will prefer to constrain their own future choices.
Strotz noted that costly commitment decisions are commonly
observed:
. . . we are often willing even to pay a price to precommit future
actions (and to avoid temptation). Evidence of this in economic and
other social behaviour is not difﬁcult to ﬁnd. It varies from the gra-
tuitous promise, from the familiar phrase “Give me a good kick if I
don’t do such and such” to savings plans such as insurance policies
and Christmas Clubs which may often be hard to justify in view of
the low rates of return. (I select the option of having my annual
salary dispersed to me on a twelve- rather than on a nine-month
basis, although I could use the interest!) Personal ﬁnancial manage-
ment ﬁrms, such as are sometimes employed by high-income profes-
sional people (e.g. actors), while having many other and perhaps
more important functions, represent the logical conclusion of the
desire to precommit one’s future economic activity. Joining the army
is perhaps the supreme device open to most people, unless it be
marriage for the sake of “settling down.” The worker whose income
is garnished chronically or who is continually harassed by creditors,
and who, when one oppressive debt is paid, immediately incurs an-
other is commonly precommiting. There is nothing irrational about
such behavior (quite the contrary) and attempts to default on debts
are simply the later consequences which are to be expected. Inabil-
ity to default is the force of the commitment.
Strotz’s list is clearly not exhaustive. In general, all illiquid
assets provide a form of commitment, though there are some-
times additional reasons that consumers might hold such assets
(e.g., high expected returns and diversiﬁcation). A pension or re-
tirement plan is the clearest example of such an asset. Many of
these plans beneﬁt from favorable tax treatment, and most of
them effectively bar consumers from using their savings before
retirement. For IRAs, Keogh plans, and 401(K) plans, consumers
can access their assets, but they must pay an early withdrawal
penalty. Moreover, borrowing against some of these assets is le-
gally treated as an early withdrawal, and hence also subject to
penalty. A less transparent instrument for commitment is an in-
vestment in an illiquid asset that generates a steady stream of
beneﬁts, but that is hard to sell due to substantial transactions
costs, informational problems, or incomplete markets. Examples
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building up equity in a personal business. Finally, there exists a
class of assets that provide a store of illiquid value, like savings
bonds, and certiﬁcates of deposit. All of the illiquid assets dis-
cussed above have the same property as the goose that laid
golden eggs. The asset promises to generate substantial beneﬁts
in the long run, but these beneﬁts are difﬁcult, if not impossible,
to realize immediately. Trying to do so will result in a substantial
capital loss.
Instruments with these golden eggs properties make up the
overwhelming majority of assets held by the U. S. household sec-
tor. For example, the Federal Reserve System publication Bal-
ance Sheets for the U. S. Economy 1945–94 reports that the
household sector held domestic assets of $28.5 trillion at year-
end 1994. Over two-thirds of these assets were illiquid, including
$5.5 trillion of pension fund and life insurance reserves, $4.5 tril-
lion of residential structures, $3.0 trillion of land, $2.5 trillion of
equity in noncorporate business, $2.5 trillion of consumer dur-
ables, and at least $1 trillion of other miscellaneous categories.
Finally, note that social security wealth and human capital, two
relatively large components of illiquid wealth, are not included in
the Federal Reserve Balance Sheets.
Despite the abundance of commitment mechanisms, and
Strotz’s well-known theoretical work, intrapersonal commitment
phenomena have generally received little attention from econo-
mists. This deﬁcit is probably explained by the fact that commit-
ment will only be chosen by decision-makers whose preferences
are dynamically inconsistent, and most economists have avoided
studying such problematic preferences. However, there is a sub-
stantial body of evidence that preferences are dynamically incon-
sistent. Research on animal and human behavior has led
psychologists to conclude that discount functions are approxi-
mately hyperbolic [Ainslie 1992].
Hyperbolic discount functions are characterized by a rela-
tively high discount rate over short horizons and a relatively low
discount rate over long horizons. This discount structure sets up
a conﬂict between today’s preferences, and the preferences that
will be held in the future. For example, from today’s perspective,
the discount rate between two far-off periods, t and t 1 1, is the
long-term low discount rate. However, from the time t perspec-
tive, the discount rate between t and t 1 1 is the short-term high
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common experiences. For example, this year I may desire to start
an aggressive savings plan next year, but when next year actually
rolls around, my taste at that time will be to postpone any sacri-
ﬁces another year. In the analysis that follows, the decision-
maker foresees these conﬂicts and uses a stylized commitment
technology to partially limit the options available in the future.
This framework predicts that consumption will track income.
Second, the model explains why consumers have a different pro-
pensity to consume out of wealth than they do out of labor in-
come. Third, the model explains why Ricardian equivalence
should not hold even in an economy characterized by an inﬁnitely
lived representative agent. Fourth, the model suggests that fi-
nancial innovation may have caused the ongoing decline in U. S.
savings rates, since ﬁnancial innovation increases liquidity and
eliminates implicit commitment opportunities. Finally, the model
provides a formal framework for considering the proposition that
ﬁnancial market innovation reduces welfare by providing “too
much” liquidity.
The body of this essay formalizes these claims. Section II lays
out the model. Equilibrium outcomes are characterized in Section
III. Section IV considers the implications of the model for the
macroeconomic issues highlighted above. Section V concludes
with a discussion of ongoing work.
II. THE CONSUMPTION DECISION
The large number of commitment devices, discussed above,
is good news for consumers. They have access to a wide array
of assets that effectively enable them to achieve many forms of
commitment. However, from the perspective of an economist, the
abundance poses a challenge. It is hard to model the institutional
richness in a realistic way without generating an extremely bur-
densome number of state variables.
I consider a highly stylized commitment technology that is
amenable to an analytic treatment. Speciﬁcally, I assume that
consumers may invest in two instruments: a liquid asset x and
an illiquid asset z. Instrument z is illiquid in the sense that a
sale of this asset has to be initiated one period before the actual
proceeds are received. So a current decision to liquidate part or
all of an individual’s z holding will generate cash ﬂow that can be
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always immediately consume their x holdings.
Consumers in this model may borrow against their holdings
of asset z. Like asset sales, such borrowing takes one period to
implement. If a consumer applies for a loan at time period t, the
associated cash ﬂow will not be available for consumption until
time period t 1 1.
In later sections I embed consumers in a general equilibrium
model in which prices will be endogenous. Now, however, I con-
sider the consumer in isolation, and assume that the consumer
faces a deterministic sequence of interest rates and wages. For
simplicity, I assume that asset z and asset x have the same rate
of return.2
The consumer makes consumption/savings decisions in dis-
crete time t [ {1, 2, . . . , T}. Every time period t is divided into
four subperiods. In the ﬁrst subperiod, production takes place.
The consumer’s liquid assets xt21 and nonliquid assets zt21—both
chosen at time period t 2 1—yield a gross return of Rt 5 1 1 rt,
and the consumer inelastically supplies one unit of labor. In the
second subperiod the consumer receives deterministic labor in-
come yt and gets access to her liquid savings, Rt × xt21. In the third
subperiod the consumer chooses current consumption,
cyR x ttt t      +  £ -1.
In the fourth subperiod the consumer chooses her new asset allo-
cations, xt and zt, subject to the constraints,
yR z x czx
xz
tt t t t t t
tt
 +   +           + 
   0.
() ,
,
-- -=
³
11
The consumer begins life with exogenous endowments x0,z 0$0.
The consumer may borrow against her illiquid assets by giv-
ing a creditor a contingent control right over some of those assets.
In exchange, the consumer receives liquidity that can be con-
sumed. Such a loan is formally represented as a reallocation of
assets from the illiquid account to the liquid account. I assume
that a loan, i.e., asset reallocation, which generates consumable
liquidity in period t 1 1 must be initiated in period t. Speciﬁcally,
1. One could alternatively assume that instantaneous access to asset z is
possible with a sufﬁciently high transaction cost.
2. The qualitative results do not hinge on the identical returns assumption.
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providing consumable liquidity in period t 1 1. Such asset reallo-
cations are subsumed in the consumer’s choice of xt and zt in sub-
period 4.
In the framework introduced above, an uncollateralized loan
has occurred if an asset reallocation leaves the illiquid account
negative. Creditors are unwilling to make such loans because a
consumer who received such a loan would not have an incentive
to repay. Hence, I assume that zt $ 0.
Finally, the constraint xt $ 0 rules out forced savings con-
tracts. If the consumer could set xt to any negative value, then
she could perfectly commit her future savings behavior and hence
her consumption level (or at least commit to any upper bound on
tomorrow’s consumption level). For example, if she foresaw a
high level of labor income next period, she could set xt negative
to force tomorrow’s self to save some of that income (recall that
ct11 # yt11 1 Rt11xt). A negative xt value would be interpreted as a
contract with an outside agent requiring the consumer to transfer
funds to the outside agent, which the outside agent would then
deposit in an illiquid account of the consumer.3 The constraint xt
$ 0 effectively rules out such contracts. Two arguments support
this implicit assumption against forced savings contracts.
First, such contracts are susceptible to renegotiation by to-
morrow’s self, and in any ﬁnite-horizon environment, the contract
would unwind. (In the second to last period renegotiation would
occur, implying renegotiation in the third to last period, etc.) Sec-
ond, such contracts are generally unenforceable in the United
States.4 To make such a contract work, tomorrow’s self must be
forced to pay the speciﬁed funds to the outside agent or be penal-
ized for not doing so (note that the transfer is not in the interest
of tomorrow’s self). However, U. S. courts will generally not en-
force contracts with a penalty of this kind.5
3. Mortgage payments are an example of a contract that xt $ 0 rules out.
However, even though mortgage payments may be interpreted as forced savings
contracts, they do not have the necessary ﬂexibility to achieve the full commit-
ment solution. Mortgage contracts generally do not make mortgage payments con-
tingent on the level of labor income ﬂows.
4. I am indebted to Robert Hall for pointing out this fact to me.
5. U. S. contract law is based around the “fundamental principle that the
law’s goal on breach of contract is not to deter breach by compelling the promisor
to perform, but rather to redress breach by compensating the promisee” [Farns-
worth 1990, p. 935]. Hence, courts allow contracts to specify “liquidated damages”
which reﬂect losses likely to be experienced by the promisee, but courts do not
allow “penalties” which do not reﬂect such losses.
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Ut with an instantaneous utility function characterized by con-
stant relative risk aversion r. Consumers are assumed to have a
discount function of the type proposed by Phelps and Pollak
[1968] in a model of intergenerational altruism, and which is
used here to model intrapersonal dynamic conﬂict:6
(1) U E uc uc tt t t
Tt
     +  =
é
ë
ê
ù
û
ú +
=
-
å () ( ). bd
t
t
t 1
I adopt equation (1) to capture the qualitative properties of
a generalized hyperbolic discount function: events t periods away
are discounted with factor (1 1a t ) 2 g / a, with a, g.0.7 This class
of discount functions was ﬁrst proposed by Chung and Herrnstein
[1961] to characterize the results of animal behavior experi-
ments.8 Their conclusions were later shown to apply to human
subjects as well (see Ainslie [1992] for a survey).
Hyperbolic discount functions imply discount rates that de-
cline as the discounted event is moved further away in time
[Loewenstein and Prelec 1992]. Events in the near future are dis-
counted at a higher implicit discount rate than events in the dis-
tant future.
Given a discount function ƒ(t), the instantaneous discount
rate at time t is deﬁned as
Applying the principle of ‘just compensation for the loss or injury actually
sustained’ to liquidated damage provisions, courts have . . . refused enforce-
ment where the clause agreed upon is held to be in terrorem—a sum ﬁxed as
a deterrent to breach or as security for full performance by the promisor, not
as a realistic assessment of the provable damage. Thus, attempts to secure
performance through in terrorem clauses are currently declared unenforce-
able even where the evidence shows a voluntary, fairly bargained exchange
[Goetz and Scott 1977, p. 555].
In our case, the promisee—the outside agent—experiences no loss if the con-
sumer fails to make the payment. Hence, penalties or liquidated damages speci-
ﬁed in such contracts are not enforceable, so the contract is incapable of
compelling tomorrow’s self to make the payment. For a more extensive discussion
of these issues, see Farnsworth [1990, pp. 935–46], Goetz and Scott [1977], and
Rea [1984].
6. Zeckhauser and Fels [1968] provide an altruism-based microfoundation
for the Phelps and Pollak preferences. Akerlof [1991] analyzes a special case of
the Phelps and Pollak preferences (d51). Akerlof assumes consumer myopia,
while my analysis assumes that consumers foresee their future preference
reversals.
7. See Loewenstein and Prelec [1992] for an axiomatic derivation of this dis-
count function.
8. Chung and Herrnstein claimed that the appropriate discount function is
an exact hyperbola: events t periods away are discounted with factor 1/t. This
corresponds to the limiting case a5g®¥ .
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Hence, an exponential discount function, dt is characterized by a
constant discount rate, log(1/d), while the generalized hyperbolic
discount function is characterized by an instantaneous discount
rate that falls as t rises:
ga t / +   () . 1
Psychologists and economists—notably Ainslie [1975, 1986,
1992], Prelec [1989], and Loewenstein and Prelec [1992]—have
argued that such declining discount rates play an important role
in generating problems of self-regulation.
When 0 ,b,1, the discount structure in equation (1) mim-
ics the qualitative property of the hyperbolic discount function,
while maintaining most of the analytical tractibility of the expo-
nential discount function. I call the discount structure in equa-
tion (1) “quasi-hyperbolic.” Note that the quasi-hyperbolic
discount function is a discrete time function with values {1, bd,
bd2, bd3,...} . Figure I graphs the exponential discount function
(assuming that d50.97), the generalized hyperbolic discount
function (assuming that a5105, and g55×103), and the quasi-
hyperbolic discount function (with b50.6 and d50.99). The
FIGURE I
Discount Functions
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 450points of the discrete-time quasi-hyperbolic function have been
connected to generate the curve in Figure I.
The preferences given by equation (1) are dynamically incon-
sistent, in the sense that preferences at date t are inconsistent
with preferences at date t 1 1. To see this, note that the marginal
rate of substitution between periods t 1 1 and t 1 2 from the
perspective of the decision-maker at time t is given by
u9(ct11)/(du9(ct12)), which is not equal to the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between those same periods from the perspective of the
decision-maker at t 1 1: u9(ct11)/(bdu9(ct12)).
To analyze equilibrium behavior when preferences are dy-
namically inconsistent, it is standard practice to formally model
a consumer as a sequence of temporal selves making choices in a
dynamic game (e.g., Pollak [1968], Peleg and Yaari [1973], and
Goldman [1980]). Hence, a T-period consumption problem trans-
lates into a T-period game, with T players, or “selves,” indexed by
their respective periods of control over the consumption decision.
(Note that self t is in control during all of the subperiods at time
t.) I look for subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) strategies of
this game.
It is helpful to introduce some standard notation that will be
used in the analysis which follows. Let ht represent a (feasible)
history at time t,s oh trepresents all the moves that have been
made from time 0 to time t 2 1: {x0,z 0 ,( c t ,x t ,z t ) t 2 1
t51}. Let
St represent the set of feasible strategies for self t. Let S 5 P T
t51 St
represent the joint strategy space of all selves. If s [ S, let s|ht
represent the path of consumption and asset allocation levels
from t to T which would arise if history ht were realized, and
selves t to T played the strategies given by s. Finally, let Ut(s|ht)
represent the continuation payoff to self t if self t expects the con-
sumption and asset allocation levels from t to T to be given by
s|ht.
III. EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGIES
This section characterizes the equilibrium strategies of the
game described above. Recall that the agent faces a deterministic
(time-varying) sequence of interest rates and a deterministic
(time-varying) labor income sequence. Unfortunately, for general
interest rate and labor income sequences, it is not possible to use
marginal conditions to characterize the equilibrium strategies.
This nonmarginality property is related to the fact that selves
who make choices at least two periods from the end of the game
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form choice set is deﬁned as the consumption vectors which are
attainable, assuming that all future selves play equilibrium
strategies. The nonconvexity in the reduced-form choice set of self
T 2 2 generates discontinuous equilibrium strategies for self
T 2 2, which in turn generate discontinuities in the equilibrium
payoff map of self T 2 3. This implies that marginal conditions
cannot be used to characterize the equilibrium choices of selves
at least three periods from the end of the game.9
I have found a restriction on the labor income process that
eliminates these problems:
(A1) uy R uy t tt i
i
t 99 () ( ) , .       1 ³ Õ æ
è
ö
ø "³ +
=
+ bd t
t
t
t
1
This restriction constrains the sequence {yt} t5T
t51 to lie in a band
whose thickness is parameterized by the value of b; the closer b
is to zero, the wider the band. Calibration of the model reveals
that A1 allows for substantial ﬂexibility in the deterministic in-
come process. Ainslie [1992] reviews evidence that the one-year
discount rate is at least 1/3. This suggests that b should be cali-
brated in the interval (0, 2/3) (assuming that d is close to unity).
To see what this implies, consider the following example. Assume
that Rt 5 R for all t, dR 5 1, and u(×) 5 ln(×). Then A1 is satisﬁed
if, for all t, yt [ [y, (1/b)y]. If b52/3, this interval becomes [y, (3/
2)y], and as b falls the interval grows even larger.
Before characterizing the equilibria of the game, it is helpful
to introduce the following deﬁnitions. First, we will say that a
joint strategy, s,i sresource exhausting if s|hT21 is characterized
by zT 5 xt 5 0, for all feasible hT21. Second, we will say that a
sequence of feasible consumption/savings actions, {ct ˆ, xt ˆ, zt ˆ,...,
c T,x T,z T}satisﬁes P1–P4 if "t $ t ˆ,
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9. For an exposition of these problems see Laibson [1993]. Related issues are
also discussed in Peleg and Yaari [1973] and Goldman [1980].
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for any feasible history ht ˆ, s|ht ˆ satisﬁes P1–P4.
It is now possible to state the main theorem of the paper.
This theorem establishes that the consumption game has a
unique equilibrium, and the theorem characterizes this
equilibrium.
THEOREM 1. Fix any T-period consumption game with exogenous
variables satisfying A1. There exists a unique resource-
exhausting joint strategy, s* [ S, that satisﬁes P1–P4, and
this strategy is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
strategy of this game.
(All proofs appear in the Appendix.) Theorem 1 implies that the
equilibrium consumption path is resource exhausting and satis-
ﬁes P1–P4. It is straightforward to see why the equilibrium path
is resource exhausting: the ﬁnal self—self T—consumes all liq-
uid resources in period T, and self T 2 1 makes certain that all
wealth is liquid in period T (i.e., zT21 5 0). Hence, no wealth goes
unconsumed in equilibrium.
Properties P1–P4 are also intuitive. It is important to inter-
pret them in light of the strategic self-control behavior that arises
in the intrapersonal consumption game. In this game, early
selves prevent late selves from splurging. Self t 2 1 uses the
illiquid asset zt21 to limit the liquidity available for consumption
in period t. Note that self t cannot consume the illiquid asset dur-
ing its period of control, ct # yt 1 Rt xt21. On the equilibrium path,
each self is endogenously liquidity constrained by the allocation
choices of earlier selves. Property P1 is simply a standard Euler
equation relation for an environment in which liquidity con-
straints exist. The inequality arises because marginal utility can
be too high relative to future marginal utilities, but it cannot be
too low since consumers always have the option to save. Property
P2 reﬂects another standard Euler equation intuition: when mar-
ginal utility is strictly too high, the liquidity constraint must be
binding. Properties P3 and P4 reﬂect the strategic decisions that
self t makes when it chooses asset allocation levels (xt and zt). P3
implies that self t will limit self t 1 1’s liquidity as much as pos-
sible (xt 5 0) if consumption at time t 1 1 is expected to be high
relative to what self t would prefer it to be. P4 implies that self t
will not limit self t 1 1’s liquidity at all (zt 5 0) if consumption at
time t 1 1 is expected to be low relative to what self t would prefer
it to be. Note that the equations associated with P3 and P4 do
not contain the b term. This omission arises because, from the
GOLDEN EGGS AND HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING 453perspective of self t, utility trade-offs between period t 1 1 and
any period after t 1 1 are independent of the value of b.
IV. ANALYSIS
In the following subsections I discuss several implications of
the golden eggs model. Some of the applications consider the
inﬁnite-horizon game that is analogous to the ﬁnite-horizon game
discussed above. When doing so, I will focus consideration on the
equilibrium that is the limit (as the horizon goes to inﬁnity) of
the unique ﬁnite-horizon equilibrium.10
A. Comovement of Consumption and Income
There is a growing body of evidence that household consump-
tion ﬂows track corresponding household income ﬂows “too”
closely, generating violations of the life-cycle/permanent-income
consumption model. In particular, household consumption is sen-
sitive to expected movements in household income: e.g., Hall and
Mishkin [1982], Zeldes [1989], Carroll and Summers [1991], Fla-
vin [1991], Carroll [1992], Shea [1995], and Souleles [1995].11
Many of these authors ﬁnd that consumption tracks expected in-
come changes even when consumers have large stocks of accumu-
lated assets.
Several models have been proposed to explain the consump-
10. For the inﬁnite horizon game, a joint strategy, s,i sresource exhausting if
the continuation paths after all histories imply that the intertemporal budget
constraint is exactly satisﬁed:
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For the inﬁnite-horizon game, I will focus on the equilibrium that satisﬁes the
following inﬁnite-horizon analogs of P1–P4:
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11. Although Runkle [1989] is unable to reject the permanent income hy-
pothesis, there are reasons to believe his test lacks power (see Shea [1995]).
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theory of savings in which impatient consumers with a precau-
tionary savings motive hold little wealth and choose optimal con-
sumption policies in which consumption and income move
together over the life-cycle. Gourinchas and Parker [1995] simu-
late an extended version of this model. Attanasio and Weber
[1993] argue that demographic dynamics explain much of the
consumption-income comovement.
The golden eggs model provides a new explanation for the
observed comovement in consumption and income. In the model,
self t 2 1 chooses xt21 to constrain the consumption of self t.I n
this way “early” selves manipulate the cash ﬂow process by keep-
ing most assets in the illiquid instrument. Hence, at any given
moment the consumer is effectively liquidity constrained, though
the constraint is self-imposed. In equilibrium consumption is ex-
actly equal to the current level of cash ﬂow: ct 5 yt 1 Rt xt21 (see
Lemma 3 in the Appendix for a formal proof). However, this does
not imply by itself that consumption will track labor income. Note
that xt21 is endogenous, and in equilibrium xt21 covaries nega-
tively with labor income. Self t 2 1 varies xt21 to try to offset the
predictable ﬂuctuations in yt. When yt is large, self t 2 1 will
make xt21 small in an effort to prevent self t from overconsuming.
However, there are limits to the ways in which “early” selves
can constrain the choices of “later” selves. Self t 2 1 can only deny
self t access to assets that have been accumulated in the past.
Self t 2 1 cannot deny self t access to yt, labor income at time t.
So when yt is particularly high (i.e., cash ﬂow at time t is particu-
larly high), consumption at time t will also be high. This implies
that on the equilibrium path, predictable movements in income
will tend to be reﬂected in movements in consumption.
An example may help to make this more concrete. Let the
horizon be inﬁnite. Assume that labor income follows a trending
high-low process: yt 5 yegt when t is odd, yt 5 yegt when t is even.
Assume that the interest rate is constant and exp(rg) 5d R. (This
last relationship is motivated by the steady state results below.)
Assume that {yt}¥
t51 satisﬁes A1. Finally, assume that x0 5 0, z0 $
0, and z0 not be “too” large relative to the labor income variability.
Speciﬁcally, z0 must satisfy the relationship,
uy R uy ez e R e
gg g 99 () ( _ () ) .      +      / £- d 0
2 2 1
Then the equilibrium consumption path is
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Figure II graphs the labor income path and equilibrium con-
sumption path, using parameter values, b50.6, R 5 1.04, g 5
0.02, y 5 z0/3 5 1, and y 5 0.8.12 Two properties stand out. First,
the illiquid asset is exclusively used to augment consumption in
the even periods, i.e., in the periods with relatively low labor in-
come. However, this increase is not sufﬁcient to smooth consump-
tion. A regression of D ln ct on D ln yt yields a coefﬁcient of .40.
Since the income process is completely deterministic, this implies
that predictable changes in income are associated with changes
in consumption. Hence, consumption tracks income despite the
fact that the consumer in this example controls a substantial
asset stock (K/Y ø 3).
B. Aggregate Saving
In most intertemporal rational choice models, high discount
rates are a necessary condition for consumption-income comove-
ment. Such relatively high discount rates, however, tend to imply
relatively low levels of capital accumulation in general equilib-
rium (see Aiyagari [1992]). The golden eggs model generates con-
sumption-income comovement even when actors are wealthy.
This is because in equilibrium decisions to dissave out of the illiq-
uid asset stock do not depend on b. Self t is not able to consume
the illiquid asset immediately, so self t does not consider trade-
offs between consumption today and consumption tomorrow
when dissaving from the illiquid instrument. Instead self t con-
siders trade-offs between consumption at t 1 1 and consumption
at periods after t 1 1. The value of b is superﬂuous for such a
decision—from self t’s perspective—and hence the steady state
capital stock is independent of b.
The following general equilibrium analysis formalizes this
intuition. Assume that there exists a continuum of individual
agents indexed by the unit interval. Individual decision and state
variables are represented with an i index (e.g., ct(i)). Consider a
standard Cobb-Douglas production function with aggregate capi-
tal Kt, aggregate labor Lt, and exogenous productivity At:
12. The remaining variables, d and r, may take on any values that satisfy
the steady state condition: exp(rg) 5d R.
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Consumption and Labor Income
YA K L tt t t    =
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Aggregate capital is composed of the liquid and illiquid capital
holdings of individual agents in the economy:
Kx i z i d i tt t      + 
0
1
º -- ò [ ( ) ( )] . 11
Recall that labor is assumed to be supplied inelastically, so L(i) 5
1, and
LL i d i tt       1 .
0
1
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In competitive equilibrium labor receives its marginal product,
so labor income of agent i at time period t is given by yt(i) 5
(1 2a ) Y t .Competitive equilibrium also implies that capital re-
ceive its marginal product, so Rt 5 1 1a Y t/Kt 2 d, where d is
the rate of depreciation. Liquid and illiquid gross asset returns
of agent i at time period t are, respectively, Rt xt21 and Rt zt21.
Finally, At is assumed to grow exogenously at rate gA, so in steady
state, capital and output must grow at rate gA/(12a) ; g.
PROPOSITION 1. In the economy described above there exists a
unique steady state that satisﬁes A1. In that steady state
(2) exp( ) rd gR    . =
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Proposition 1 is that the parameter b does not appear in the equa-
tion relating the discount rate and the growth rate. So b can be
calibrated to generate excess sensitivity (i.e., consumption-
income comovement), while d can be calibrated to match the his-
torical capital-output ratio of three. If b is in the interior of the
unit interval, then the equilibrium path will exhibit consump-
tion-income tracking (e.g., see the example in previous subsec-
tion). Meanwhile, d can be chosen to satisfy the equation,
(3) rd a d gr Y K d           /        , »- - = -- - ()( ) () 11
which is a log-linearized version of equation (2). Setting d50.98
rationalizes K/Y 5 3, assuming that the other parameters in the
equation take standard values: r51, g 5 0.02, a50.36, d 5
0.08.
C. Asset-Speciﬁc MPCs
Thaler [1990] argues that consumers have different marginal
propensities to consume for different categories of assets. For ex-
ample, he presents evidence that an unexpected increase in the
value of an equity portfolio will have a very small effect on con-
sumption, while an unexpected job-related bonus will be immedi-
ately consumed. Thaler divides consumer wealth into three
categories: current income, net assets, and future income. He
cites a wide body of evidence which suggests that “the MPC from
[current income] is close to unity, the MPC from [future income]
is close to zero, and the MPC from [net assets] is somewhere in
between.” Thaler explains this behavior by postulating that con-
sumers use a system of nonfungible mental accounts to guide
rule-of-thumb decision-making. By contrast, the golden eggs
model predicts that even fully rational consumers will exhibit
asset-speciﬁc MPCs.13
In the golden eggs model the current self is always endoge-
nously liquidity constrained on the equilibrium path. So the MPC
out of current cash ﬂow is one. Proposition 2 formalizes this
claim.
13. Laibson [1994b] proposes another hyperbolic discounting model that gen-
erates some mental accounting behavior. In Laibson [1994b] rational consumers
set up a system of self-rewards and self-punishments to motivate later selves to
exert high effort. Laibson [1994b] discusses effort-related mental accounts, while
the current paper discusses liquidity-related mental accounts.
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A1 is strictly satisﬁed. Let ct 5 ct(Rtxt21,R tz t 2 1) represent the
equilibrium (Markov) consumption strategy of self t. Then,
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when the partial derivative is evaluated on the equilibrium
path.
In this subsection I contrast this MPC with its analog for
illiquid assets. At ﬁrst glance it is not clear how to best make this
comparison. I will consider two approaches.
PROPOSITION 3. Fix a consumption game in which inequality A1
is strictly satisﬁed. Let ct(Rtxt21,R tz t 2 1) represent the equilib-
rium (Markov) consumption strategy of self t. Then,
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when the partial derivative is evaluated on the equilibrium
path.
This result is not surprising, since on the equilibrium path
the individual always faces a self-imposed liquidity constraint.
Small perturbations to the illiquid asset stock are not sufﬁcient
to stop the current self’s liquidity constraint from being binding.
A more interesting question to ask is how a perturbation to zt21
affects the choice of xt. Recall that liquid assets set aside at time
t will be completely consumed at time t 1 1. Unfortunately, the
value of ¶xt/¶(Rtzt21) can take on any value between zero and one.
For example, the partial derivative is equal to zero if the equilib-
rium value of xt is equal to zero. The partial derivative is equal to
unity if t is the penultimate period of the game. It would be help-
ful to develop an MPC measure that provides a representative
value of ¶xt/¶(Rtzt21). The following proposition introduces such a
measure, by considering the geometric average of MPCs over a
deterministic business cycle of duration t.
PROPOSITION 4. Fix any ¥–horizon consumption game with Rt 5
R " t. Fix a particular value of t$1. Assume that {yt}¥
t51
satisﬁes A1, and yt1t 5 exp(tg)yt, " t $ 0. Assume that
exp(rg) 5d R. Let xt 5 xt(R × xt21, R × zt21) represent the equi-
librium (Markov) consumption strategy of self t. Let
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Note that Proposition 4 assumes that the growth rate of la-
bor income is related to the return on capital by the steady state
equation in Proposition 2: exp(rg) 5d R. Note also that the re-
sulting measure of the marginal propensity to consume, 1 2
(dR12r)1/r, is equivalent to the marginal propensity to consume in
the standard Ramsey model with no liquidity constraints and ex-
ponential discount function dt. For all reasonable parameter val-
ues MPCz is close to zero. Recall that the ﬁrst proposed measure
of the MPC out of illiquid assets (i.e., the MPC measure intro-
duced in Proposition 3) was exactly equal to zero. Finally, con-
trast these proposed measures of the MPC out of illiquid assets
(which take values close to or exactly equal to zero) with the unity
marginal propensity to consume out of liquid assets.
D. Ricardian Equivalence
In the economy analyzed in this paper, the sequence of exoge-
nous cash ﬂows matters, in a way that is independent of the pres-
ent value of those cash ﬂows. This is immediately apparent from
Figure II. Because taxation schemes affect these exogenous cash
ﬂows, Ricardian equivalence will be violated. Moreover, the
model generates such violations even when the consumer has a
large asset stock at all times. Hence, Ricardian equivalence is
violated for all agents, whether or not they hold substantial
wealth.
E. Declining Savings Rates in the 1980s
The golden eggs model may help to explain the decline in
U. S. savings rates during the 1980s. I pursue two approaches in
this subsection. The ﬁrst explanation is driven by the fact that
during the 1980s a relatively large proportion of national income
was realized as cash ﬂow to consumers. However, I am unsatis-
ﬁed with this ﬁrst story for reasons that I describe below. Hence,
I focus most of my attention on a second explanation that is
driven by developments in the consumer credit market.
Hatsopoulos, Krugman, and Poterba [1989] document the ob-
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was high during the 1980s relative to the 1970s. They report that
from 1970–1979 cash ﬂow averaged 77.9 percent of NNP, while
the corresponding number for the 1980–1987 period was 80.8 per-
cent. They trace this increase to several sources, notably higher
interest income (4.5 percentage points), higher transfers (2.2 per-
centage points), and higher after-tax cash from takeovers (0.6
percentage points).14
Using aggregate data, Hatsopoulos, Krugman, and Poterba
[1989] estimate a high marginal propensity to consume out of
current cash ﬂow. Coupling this result with the higher cash ﬂow
levels, they are able to explain most of the savings decline in the
1980s. However, they do not explain why consumers should have
such a high propensity to consume out of cash ﬂow. The golden
eggs model complements their analysis by providing a model that
explains the high MPC. However, note that the golden eggs model
can only explain the high MPC out of cash ﬂow; the model cannot
explain why the cash ﬂow was high in the ﬁrst place. Hence, ap-
plication of the golden eggs model may only relabel the puzzle,
changing it from a consumption puzzle to a cash ﬂow puzzle.
The golden eggs model suggests a second explanation for the
low level of savings during the past decade. The 1980s was a pe-
riod of rapid expansion in the U. S. consumer credit market.
Increasing access to instantaneous credit has reduced the effec-
tiveness of commitment devices like illiquid assets. The golden
eggs model predicts that the elimination of commitment devices
would lower the level of capital accumulation. I will show that if
the credit market were to become sufﬁciently sophisticated that
consumers could instantaneously borrow against their illiquid
assets, then the steady state capital-output ratio would fall. I
calibrate this fall at the end of the subsection.
The rapid expansion of the U. S. consumer credit market pro-
vides the starting point for the argument summarized in the pre-
vious paragraph. One example of the expansion in instantaneous
credit has been the growth in credit cards.15 In 1970 only 16 per-
cent of all U. S. families had a third party credit card (e.g., prede-
14. Offsetting falls in cash ﬂow occurred in labor income (20.3 percentage
points), noninterest capital income in disposable income (22.0 percentage points),
and taxes (22.1 percentage points).
15. Another important development in the U. S. credit market has been the
expanded use of home equity lines of credit. Before the mid-1980s home equity
lines of credit were almost unheard of. By 1993–1994 8.3 percent of homeowners
had a home equity line of credit. See Canner and Luckett [1994], p. 572.
GOLDEN EGGS AND HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING 461cessors of current cards like Visa and MasterCard). By 1989 54
percent had one.16 During this same period credit card acceptance
by retailers also increased dramatically. Large retailers did not
accept credit cards during the 1970s. In 1979 J. C. Penney broke
ranks with its competitors and became the ﬁrst major retailer to
accept third party credit cards. By the end of the 1980s almost
all large retailers accepted third party cards. The growth ofATMs
(automatic teller machines) augmented the impact of the credit
card expansion by enabling credit cardholders to readily receive
cash advances. Regional and national ATM networks ﬁrst began
to form in the late 1970s and early 1980s.17 Altogether these
developments led to an explosion in revolving credit, which is
principally composed of credit card debt. From 1970 to 1995, re-
volving credit grew from 3.7 percent to 36.3 percent of total con-
sumer credit.18 No single year stands out as the date at which
most consumers experienced a sharp increase in their personal
access to instantaneous credit. However, it is safe to say that by
the mid-1980s most families had a third party credit card, and
this card could be used in most large retail stores, or could be
used in ATMs to receive cash advances to make purchases in the
stores that still did not accept credit cards. Together these obser-
vations suggest that the mid-1980s represents the ﬁrst time that
a representative U. S. family had instantaneous access to con-
sumer credit, or could rapidly apply for such access.
Introducing instantaneous credit into the golden eggs model
dramatically changes the equilibrium analysis. (Recall that the
original model had credit which could be accessed with a one-
period delay.) In the original model consumption was bounded
above by cash on hand:
cy R x ttt t        +  £ -1.
With instantaneous access to credit, consumption is now con-
strained to lie below the sum of cash on hand and the value of all
credit lines that can be instantaneously set up or are already set
16. See Canner and Luckett [1992], p. 656.
17. See Mandell [1990] for a short history of the credit card industry.
18. Consumer credit includes automobile loans, revolving credit, “other” in-
stallment credit, and noninstallment credit. “Other” installment credit includes
“mobile home loans and all other installment loans not included in automobile or
revolving credit, such as loans for education, boats, trailers, or vacations. These
loans may be secured or unsecured. Noninstallment credit is credit scheduled to
be repaid in a lump sum, including single-payment loans, charge accounts, and
service credit” [Economic Report of the President 1996, Table B-73].
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 462up. I assume that the value of these existing and potential credit
lines is approximately equal to the value of the illiquid assets
held by the consumer. Hence, consumption is now constrained by
c y Rx Rz ttt t t t        +    +  .  £ -- 11
In all other ways the model remains the same.
PROPOSITION 5. Consider the general equilibrium economy ana-
lyzed above, but now assume that consumers can instantane-
ously borrow against their illiquid asset. This economy is
equivalent to one in which there is no illiquid asset (i.e., x is
the only asset). In such an economy there exists a unique
steady state, and in that steady state,
(4) exp( ) ( ) exp( ). rb d b d gR g      +      =- 1
C OROLLARY. In the steady state characterized in Proposition 5
the capital-output ratio is less than the steady state capital-
output ratio in the economy with the commitment
technology.
Table I reports the magnitude of the reduction in steady state
capital that occurs when ﬁnancial innovation moves an economy
from a golden eggs ﬁnancial technology to a new ﬁnancial tech-
nology in which it is possible to instantaneously borrow against
the illiquid asset (i.e., when ﬁnancial innovation eliminates the
illiquidity that makes partial commitment possible). The entries
of Table I are derived in ﬁve steps. First, I assume that the U. S.
economy has historically been a golden eggs economy, with a5
0.36, d 5 0.08, g 5 0.02, and K/Y 5 3. Second, I calibrate prefer-
ence parameters r and d based on equation (2) (the steady state
equation in golden eggs economies) and the competitive equilib-
rium condition, r 5 aY/K 2 d 5 (0.36)
1
32 0.08. (Recall that equa-
tion (2) is independent of b.) These equations jointly imply that
(5) exp( ( . )) ( . ). rd 00 2 10 4    =
Third, I take the set of preference parameter values derived in
step 2 (i.e., deﬁned in equation (5)) and plug that set into equa-
tion (4), the new steady state equation (i.e., the steady state equa-
tion associated with the economy in which consumers can
instantaneously borrow against their illiquid assets). This yields
the following “constrained” steady state equation that holds in
the new economy:
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STEADY STATE INTEREST RATES AND CAPITAL-OUTPUT RATIOS IN ECONOMIES WITH
AND WITHOUT PARTIAL COMMITMENT
With commitment Without commitment
(i.e., no instantaneous (i.e., instantaneous
credit) credit)
r
K
Y
r
K
Y
b50.2 0.040 3.00 0.119 1.81
b50.4 0.040 3.00 0.070 2.40
b50.6 0.040 3.00 0.053 2.70
b50.8 0.040 3.00 0.045 2.88
b51.0 0.040 3.00 0.040 3.00
(6) 10 4 0 2 . )exp(. ).      + (1    =- bb R
Note that this constrained steady state relationship is indepen-
dent of r and d, and depends exclusively on b and R. Fourth, I
vary b, the only free preference parameter in the constrained new
steady state equation, and calculate the corresponding capital-
output ratios (again using the competitive equilibrium relation-
ship r 5 a(Y/K) 2 d). Fifth, I compare these new capital-output
ratios with the historical capital-output ratio.
Note that when commitment is available, the steady state
interest rate and capital-output ratio are independent of the
value of b (see Proposition 1). Now consider an example of a tran-
sition from a commitment economy to an economy without com-
mitment. For a b value of 0.6, elimination of the commitment
technology raises the steady state real interest rate 1.3 percent-
age points. This corresponds to a reduction in the capital-output
ratio of 0.3.
These results should be compared with actual U. S. experi-
ence during the 1980s and 1990s. The model predicts that capital
accumulation should have fallen at the same time that consum-
ers gained access to instantaneous credit (approximately the mid-
1980s). All measures of capital accumulation show a marked
downturn that starts in the 1980s and continues into the 1990s.
For example, U. S. personal savings as a percent of disposable
personal income fell from an average of 7.3 percent from 1946–
1984, to an average of 5.3 percent from 1985–1994. The 1985–
1994 period had the lowest average saving rate of any ten-year
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 464span in the postwar period.19 The ratio of national net worth to
gross national product (i.e., the U. S. capital-output ratio) fell
from an average of 3.2 from 1946–1984, to 2.8 in 1994. The 1994
value is the low point for the series in the postwar period.20
F. Welfare Analysis of Financial Innovation
The introduction of instantaneous credit increases consum-
ers’ choice sets. Standard economic models imply that this devel-
opment might lower levels of capital accumulation, but would
raise consumer welfare. Yet, in the United States, policy-makers
and pundits are concerned that instantaneous credit is somehow
bad for consumers.
The golden eggs framework provides a formal model of the
costs of ﬁnancial innovation. By enabling the consumer to instan-
taneously borrow against illiquid assets, ﬁnancial innovation
eliminates the possibility for partial commitment. This has two
effects on the welfare of the current self. First, the current self no
longer faces a self-imposed liquidity constraint and can therefore
consume more in its period of control. Second, future selves are
also no longer liquidity constrained and may also consume at a
higher rate out of the wealth stock that they inherit. The ﬁrst
effect makes the current self better off. The second effect makes
the current self worse off (since the current self would like to con-
strain the consumption of future selves). Under most parameter-
izations the impact of the second effect dominates, and the
welfare of the current self is reduced.
Formally, I measure the welfare loss by calculating the mini-
mum one-time payment—paid to a representative consumer—
which would induce the representative consumer to switch from
an inﬁnite horizon golden eggs economy to an inﬁnite horizon in-
stantaneous credit economy. (Using the notation of Section II, the
hypothetical payment that induces indifference is made during
subperiod 2 of time t, and the indifference is from the perspective
of self t.) I assume that the representative consumer starts in
19. National Income and Product Accounts, Table 2.1, Bureau of Economic
Analysis, U. S. Department of Commerce.
20. National net worth is calculated from Tables B.11 and B.109 in Balance
Sheets for the U. S. Economy 1945–94, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System. National net worth represents the sum of lines 1 and 30 from Table B.11
added to the difference between lines 43 and 42 from Table B.109. Gross national
product is calculated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U. S. Department of
Commerce.
GOLDEN EGGS AND HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING 465the steady state of the golden eggs economy; this steady state is
characterized in Proposition 1. The representative agent remains
in that steady state if she remains in the golden eggs economy.
By contrast, if the representative agent switches to the instanta-
neous credit economy (i.e., if she switches to the economy in
which it is possible to instantaneously borrow against illiquid
assets), then the new economy asymptotically converges to the
steady state characterized in Proposition 5. The starting point
for this convergence is the golden eggs steady state capital stock
augmented (depleted) by a payment at time period one.
I calibrate this exercise with a50.36, d 5 0.08, g 5 0.02,
d50.98 and r51, and I assume that the golden eggs steady
state is characterized by the historical capital-output ratio K/Y 5
3. Note that these values are consistent with the steady state
equation for the golden eggs economy (see Proposition 1).
The convergence path for the economy in which instanta-
neous borrowing is possible is characterized by a nonstandard
Euler equation derived in Laibson [1996]:
(7) uc R uc ttt 99 () ( ) [( ) ] ,          +  =- ++ 11 11 dl b
where l is given by21
(8) l d
db
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.
Note that when b51 this Euler equation reduces to the standard
case. To solve for the convergence path conditional on a starting
level of ﬁnancial wealth, it is necessary to search for the unique
sequence {ct, Rt}¥
t51 that is 1) consistent with the nonstandard Eu-
ler equation given above; 2) consistent with the dynamic budget
constraint; 3) consistent with the capital market competitive
equilibrium condition; and 4) consistent with asymptotic conver-
gence to the steady state characterized in Proposition 5. Identi-
fying this sequence can be reduced to a one-dimensional search
over values of c1: start with a guess of the equilibrium value of c1;
combine this value of c1 with the dynamic budget constraint and
the competitive equilibrium conditions to generate R2; use the
nonstandard Euler equation to calculate c2 as a function of c1 and
R2; iterate the last two steps to generate a sequence {ct, Rt}¥
t51
that can be checked for asymptotic steady state convergence; if
the sequence does not converge, start with a new guess for c1.
This algorithm provides a way of calculating the convergence
21. The derivation for l uses the calibration assumption r51.
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 466path given any level of initial ﬁnancial wealth in the instanta-
neous credit economy. Once this has been done, it is straightfor-
ward to calculate the level of initial ﬁnancial wealth in the
instantaneous credit economy that induces indifference with
the level of initial ﬁnancial wealth in the golden eggs economy.
The payment level is the difference between these two ﬁnancial
wealth levels. The payment level is reported in Table II, where it
is normalized by the level of output at time of payment.22 Note
that a positive payment implies that the consumer needs compen-
sation to induce her to willingly switch to the instantaneous
credit scenario. Hence, if payment were withheld, the consumer
would be worse off in the instantaneous credit scenario. Table II
reports these normalized payments for a range of b values.
Note that when b51 there is no welfare loss. When b51,
the consumer’s preferences are not dynamically inconsistent, and
the consumer has no need to constrain her future selves. By con-
trast, for the other cases, (b [ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8}) the consumer
is made worse off by ﬁnancial innovation. Being able to borrow
against illiquid assets is welfare reducing. However, note that
this is not always the case. For b values sufﬁciently close to zero,
the consumer is made better off by being able to splurge almost
all of her ﬁnancial wealth immediately. However, for the range of
reasonable b values reported in Table II, the consumer is always
made worse off by ﬁnancial innovation.
Of course the costs of ﬁnancial innovation explored above
may be offset by unmodeled gains, like being able to consume in
unforeseen emergencies (which are ruled out in the deterministic
framework of this paper). The point of this subsection is to dem-
TABLE II
PAYMENTS TO INDUCE INDIFFERENCE
BETWEEN GOLDEN EGGS ECONOMY
AND INSTANTANEOUS CREDIT ECONOMY
Payment as
percent of output
b50.2 69.6
b50.4 29.5
b50.6 9.0
b50.8 1.6
b51.0 0.0
22. Note that output at time of payment is the same under the two scenarios,
since output at any given period is determined by capital put aside in the previ-
ous period.
GOLDEN EGGS AND HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING 467onstrate that there are potentially important costs that accom-
pany those other well-known beneﬁts of extra liquidity.
V. EVALUATION AND EXTENSIONS
I have analyzed the consumption problem of a dynamically
inconsistent decision-maker who has access to a crude commit-
ment mechanism. The model helps to explain many of the empiri-
cal puzzles in the consumption literature, notably consumption-
income tracking and asset-speciﬁc MPCs. However, the model
has several drawbacks that suggest four important areas to pur-
sue extensions.
First, the golden eggs model does not explain how consumers
accumulate assets in the ﬁrst place. Note that consumption is
always greater than labor income on the equilibrium path. How-
ever, this is less of a problem than it might ﬁrst appear. Although
there is evidence that individuals often consume less than they
earn in labor income, most of this saving is nondiscretionary (e.g.,
pension contributions, life-insurance payments, mortgage pay-
ments, and other payments to creditors). Bringing such “nondis-
cretionary savings” into the model can be done very simply. For
example, the consumer could elect to take on a 30-period mort-
gage obligation at time zero, represented by a mortgage payment
of m for the next 30 periods. Then the consumer’s cash ﬂow at
time t # 30 would be yt 1 Rtxt21 2 m, which would be less than
yt if m were greater than Rtxt21.Arelated way to model nondiscre-
tionary savings would be to let the consumer set xt21 itself less
than zero, (e.g., x # xt21, where x , 0).
A second problem associated with the model is the anoma-
lous prediction that consumers will always face a binding self-
imposed liquidity constraint. For example, the golden eggs model
predicts that after making their consumption choice, consumers
should have no liquid funds left in their bank accounts. This pre-
diction contradicts many consumers’ experiences. However, this
problem can be readily addressed by introducing a precautionary
savings motive for holding liquidity. For example, consider a
continuous-time analog of the golden eggs model, and assume
that instantaneous liquidity needs arrive with some hazard rate.
Then in equilibrium the consumer will only rarely completely ex-
haust her liquidity.
A third problem with the golden eggs model is that some con-
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 468sumers may not need to use external commitment devices (like
illiquid assets) to achieve self-control. Consumers may have in-
ternal self-control mechanisms, like “will power” and “personal
rules.” In Laibson [1994a] I analyze an inﬁnite-horizon consump-
tion/savings game with no external commitment technology and
ﬁnd a multiplicity of Pareto-rankable equilibria. I interpret this
multiplicity as a potential model for self-control and willpower.
However, this approach raises problematic and as yet unresolved
equilibrium selection problems. More work is needed to develop
theoretically robust models of internal self-control mechanisms,
and to empirically validate such models.
The fourth problem with the golden eggs model is that some
consumers may have access to an array of “social” commitment
devices that are far richer than the simple illiquid asset proposed
in this essay. In Laibson [1994b] I analyze the problem of a con-
sumer who can use social systems like marriage, work, and
friendship to achieve personal commitment. Future work should
try to identify the most important mechanisms that consumers
use to overcome the self-control problems induced by hyperbolic
preferences.
APPENDIX
Theorem 1 is proved with four intermediate lemmas. These
lemmas apply to the game described in Theorem 1.
LEMMA 1. Let s be a resource-exhausting element of the joint
strategy space S. Assume that s satisﬁes P1–P4. Then for all
histories ht, strategy s implies that ct $ yt.
Proof of Lemma 1. Use induction to prove result. Fix a period
t and feasible history, ht. Let s|ht 5 {cA
t1t, xA
t1t, zA
t1t}T2t
t50. Assume
that ct1t $ yt1t " t$1. By P1, u9(ct) $ maxtÎ{1 , ... , T 2 tbdt
(Pt
i51Rt1i) u9(ct1t). If this inequality is strict, then P2 implies that
ct $ yt. So WLOG assume that u9(ct) 5 maxt$1bdt (Pt
i51Rt1i)u9(ct1t):
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GOLDEN EGGS AND HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING 469So u9(ct) # u9(yt), and hence ct $ yt. After conﬁrming that cT $ yT
(by resource exhaustion), the proof is completed by applying a
standard induction argument.
LEMMA 2. Let sA and sB be resource-exhausting elements of the
joint strategy space S. Assume that sA and sB satisfy P1–P4.
Let {cA
t , xA
t , zA
t }T
t51 and {cB
t , xB
t , zB
t }T
t51 be the respective paths of
actions generated by sA and sB. Fix a particular value of t,
and assume cA
t1t $ cB
t1t " t$1, with cA
t1t . cB
t1t for at least
one t$1. Then cA
t $ cB
t .
Proof of Lemma 2. By P1, u9(cA
t ) $ maxt[{1 ,..., T21 }bdt
(Pt
i51 Rt1i) u9(cA
t1t). If this is satisﬁed with equality, then
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Hence, u9(cB
t ) $ u9(cA
t ), implying that cA
t $ cB
t . So WLOG assume
that u9(cA
t ) . maxt[{1 ,..., T 2 t 2 1 }bdt (Pt
i51 Rt1i) u9(cA
t1t). By P2, cA
t 5 yt
1 Rtxt21.I ft51, then cA
t $ cB
t , since cB
1 # y1 1 R1x0 5 cA
1. So
WLOG assume that t $ 2. If xB
t21 $ xA
t21, then cB
t # yt 1 RtxB
t21 #
yt 1 RtxA
t21 5 cA
t . So WLOG assume xB
t21 . xA
t21 $ 0.
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Hence, u9(cB
t ) $ u9(cA
t ), implying that cA
t $ cB
t .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 470LEMMA 3. Let s be a resource-exhausting element of the joint
strategy space S. Assume that s satisﬁes P1–P4. Let {ct, xt,
zt}T
t51 represent the path of actions generated by s. Then ct 5
yt 1 Rtxt21" t $ 2.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose thatct ,yt 1Rtxt21 forsomet$2
and look for a contradiction. By P1 and P2, u9(ct) 5
maxt[{1 ,..., T 2 t 2 1 } bdt (Pt
i51 Rt1i)u9(ct1t), so u9(ct) ,
maxt{{1 ,..., T 2 t 2 1 }d t( P t
i 5 1R t 1 i)u9(ct1t). Hence, by P3, xt21 5 0. So ct ,
yt, which contradicts Lemma 1.
LEMMA 4. Let {ct,x t,z t } T
t 5 1be a solution path to the following
problem:
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Proof of Lemma 4. The ﬁrst step in the proof is to show that
the solution set of the program above is a subset of the solution
set of the program below.
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Henceforth I will refer to these, respectively, as program I and
program II. Note that program II is a convex program with linear
GOLDEN EGGS AND HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING 471constraints, so the Kuhn-Tucker ﬁrst-order conditions are neces-
sary and sufﬁcient for a global optimum. I will return to this fact
later in the proof.
The following notation will be used to prove the lemma. Let
V represent the set of all real vectors, v5{ c t,x t,z t} T
t 5 1. Let CI ,
V (CII , V) represent the subset of vectors in V which satisfy the
constraints of program I (II). Let C* I , V (C* II , V) represent the
subset of vectors in V that are solutions to program I (II).
The ﬁrst step in the proof is to show that CI , CII. Fix any v
[ CI, and let v5{ c t,x t,z t} T
t 5 1. Note that the ﬁrst ﬁve constraints
of program I are identical to the ﬁrst ﬁve constraints of program
II. Also note that if {ct, xt, zt}T
t52 satisﬁes P1–P4, then by Lemma
1, c2 $ y2, and by Lemma 3, ct 5 yt 1 Rtxt21 " t $ 3. Hence, v [
CII, implying that CI , CII.
The next step is to show C* I , C* II. Fix any v [ C* I . Fix any
v9 [ C* II, and let v9 5 {ct, xt, zt}T
t51. Deﬁne x ˆ1 such that c2 5 y2 1
R2x ˆ1. Let v0 be equivalent to v9 except that x1 is replaced by x ˆ1,
and z1 is replaced by z ˆ1 5 z1 2 (x ˆ1 2 x1). Let U(v) represent the
value of the objective function evaluated at v. Consider the fol-
lowing two properties of v0: v0 [ CII, U(v9) 5 U(v0). Recall that
v9 [ C* II. Then v0 must also be an element of C* II. Hence v0 must
satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of program II (since the con-
ditions are necessary and sufﬁcient). Using the Kuhn-Tucker con-
ditions and the deﬁnition of v0, it is straightforward to show that
v0 [ CI. Note that v0 [ C* II and v [ C* I , CI , CII imply that
U(v0) $ U(v). Note that v [ C* I and v0 [ CI imply that U(v0) #
U(v). Hence, U(v) 5 U(v0), which implies that U(v) 5 U(v9). So
v9 [ C* II and v [ C* I , CI , CII imply that v [ C* II. Hence,
C* I , C* II.
I am now ready to complete the proof of the lemma. Let v be
a solution to program I, and let v5{ c t ,x t ,z t } T
t 5 1 .S o{ c t ,x t ,z t } T
t 5 2
satisﬁes P1–P4. Since C* I , C* II, v must also satisfy the necessary
and sufﬁcient Kuhn-Tucker conditions of program II. Combining
these constraints, it is straightforward to show that {ct, xt, zt}T
t51
satisﬁes P1–P4. N
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that there exist two resource-
exhausting joint strategies, sA, sB [ S, that satisfy P1–P4. Fix any
period t, and any feasible history ht. Let sA|ht ;
{cA
t1t, xA
t1t, zA
t1t}T2t
t50, sB|ht ; {cB
t1t, xB
t1t, zB
t1t}T2t
t50. By resource exhaus-
tion and Lemma 2, cA
t1t 5 cB
t1t " t$0. Hence, by Lemma 3, x
A
t1t 5 xB
t1t " t$0. This in turn implies that zA
t1t 5 zB
t1t " t$0, as
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 472a result of the savings constraints. Because the proof started with
arbitary ht, we can conclude that sA 5 sB proving that there exists
a unique resource-exhausting joint strategy, s* [ S, that satisﬁes
P1–P4. The second part of the theorem follows from this unique-
ness result, Lemma 4, and a standard induction argument. N
Proof of Proposition 1. If a steady state satisﬁes A1, then
exp(rg) $ Rd. Moreover, it is easy to construct a steady state at
which exp(rg) 5 Rd. Suppose that there exists a steady state
at which exp(rg) . Rd. Then by P1–P4, limt®¥zt 5 limt®¥xt 5 0,
which implies that no such steady state could exist. N
Proof of Proposition 2. By P1, u9(ct) $b d t( P t
i 5 1R t 1 i)u 9 ( c t 1 t)"
t$2, t$0. Suppose that this inequality is satisﬁed exactly for
some t, t pair. Then xt21 5 0 by P3. Hence,
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But u9(yt) #b d t( P t
i 5 1R t 1 i )u 9 ( y t 1 t ) violates A1, (since A1 is as-
sumed to hold strictly). So WLOG, assume that u9(ct) .b d t
( P t
i 5 1 R t 1 i ) u 9 ( c t 1 t ) " t $ 2, t$0. Hence, for sufﬁciently small |e|
. 0, u9(ct1e) .b d t( P t
i 5 1R t 1 i)u 9 ( c t 1 t)"t$2, t$0. So by P3 and
the uniqueness result of Theorem 1, in the subgame starting after
any sufﬁciently small perturbation to the liquid asset stock, the
equality ct 5 yt 1 Rtxt21 continues to hold, and hence, ¶ct/(¶(Rt
xt21)) 5 1. N
Proof of Proposition 3. WLOG, assume that u9(ct) .b d t
( P t
i 5 1R t 1 i ) u 9 ( c t 1 t ) " t $ 2, t$0 (see Proof of Proposition 2). Hence,
for sufﬁciently small |e| . 0, u9(ct) .b d t( P t
i 5 1R t 1 i ) u 9( c t 1 t1
( P t
i 5 1 R i ) e ) " t $ 2, t$0. So current consumption does not change
when zt21 is perturbed. N
Proposition 4 is proved with two intermediate lemmas.
LEMMA 5. Fix the economy described in Proposition 4. On the
equilibrium path of this game u9(ct) 5 (dR)tu9(ct1t) " t $ 2.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose that u9(ct) , (dR)tu9(ct1t) for some
t $ 2. Then P3 implies xt21 5 0, implying that
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t , (dR)ty2r
t1t, implying that exp(tg)yt . yt1t, which con-
tradicts the assumptions of Proposition 4.
Alternatively, suppose that u9(ct) . (dR)tu9(ct1t) for some t $
2. Then,
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Note that u9(yt) 5 (dR)tu9(yt1t), follows from the assumptions. So
the previous inequalities imply that xt1t21 . 0, which together
with P3 implies that u9(ct1t) $ supn$1(dR)nu9(ct1t1n). In addition,
xt1t21 . 0, implies that zt21 . 0, which together with P4 implies
that u9(ct) # supn$1(dR)nu9(ct1n). So there exists a ﬁnite t ˆ [ {t 1
1, t 1 2 ,...,t1t21 } , such that u9(ct ˆ) . supn$1(dR)nu9(ct ˆ1n).
Hence, by P4, zt ˆ21 5 0, contradicting the result that xt1t21 . 0. N
LEMMA 6. Fix the economy described in Proposition 4. On the
equilibrium path of this game xt1t 5 exp(tg)xt, zt1t 5
exp(tg)zt, " t $ 1.
Proof of Lemma 6. By Lemma 5, u9(ct) 5 (dR)tu9(ct1t) " t $
2. Combining this with Lemma 3 implies that u9(yt 1 Rxt21)
5 (dR)tu9(yt1t 1 Rxt1t21). The assumptions, exp(rg) 5d Rand
yt1t 5 exp(tg)yt, can be used to simplify the previous equation,
yielding, xt1t21 5 exp(tg)xt21 " t $ 2. Note that resource exhaus-
tion and Lemma 3 together imply that zt 5S ¥
i 5 1R 2 i x t 1 i"t$1.
So zt1t 5S ¥
i 5 1R 2 ix t 1 t 1 i5S ¥
i 5 1R 2 iexp(tg)xt1i 5 exp(tg)zt " t $ 1.N
Proof of Proposition 4. To prove this proposition, I consider
two games: an original game, and a perturbed game. The per-
turbed game is identical to the original game except that in the
perturbed game illiquid assets are higher at time zero. Let Da
represent the difference between variable a in the perturbed
game and variable a in the original game. Then Lemma 3 im-
plies that
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where the second to last equality follows from Lemma 6. N
Proof of Proposition 5. Laibson [1996] analyzes the economy
without the commitment technology. I show that the inﬁnite hori-
zon equilibrium which corresponds to the limit of the ﬁnite hori-
zon equilibria is characterized by constant proportional
consumption of the wealth stock, where wealth is deﬁned as the
sum of ﬁnancial assets and the discounted value of future labor
income. Let l represent the coefﬁcient of proportionality; I show
that l is given by
ld l b
rr           +  
1/ =- -
- 11 1
1 [( ( ) ) ] . R
With proportional consumption the steady state condition is
Rg ( ) exp( ). 1        -= l
Solving these equations to eliminate l yields equation (4). N
Proof of Corollary to Proposition 5. Let R* represent the
steady state gross interest rate in the economy with commitment.
Recall Proposition 1: exp(rg) 5d R *. Using Proposition 5, it fol-
lows that R2R* 5 (r2g)(12b) . 0a sr.gis required for the
existence of a steady state.
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